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The basic statutory authority for a Texas court to divide property in a decree of divorce or annulment is set out in section 3.63
of the Texas Family Code." As originally adopted in -the Texas
• B.B.A., St. Mary's University (1964); L.L.B., St. Mary's University (1964); Partner,
Stewart, Hemmi & Pennypacker, San Antonio, Texas.
•* B.A., University of Texas (1972); J.D., University of Texas (1975); Associate, Stewart, Hemmi & Pennypacker, San Antonio, Texas.
1. TEx. FAM. Con ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982), which reads:
§ 3.63. Division of Property
(a) In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall order a division of the
estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due
regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.
(b) In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall also order a division of the
following real and personal property, wherever situated, in a manner that the court
deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children
of the marriage:
(1) property that was acquired by either spouse while domiciled elsewhere
and that would have been community property if the spouse who acquired the
property had been domiciled in this state at the time of the acquisition; or
(2) property that was acquired by either spouse in exchange for real or personal property, and that would have been community property if the spouse
who acquired the property so exchanged had been domiciled in this state at
the time of its acquisition.
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Family Code, this section authorized the trial court, in a divorce or
annulment proceeding, to order a division of the estate of the parties, although the term "estate of the parties" was not defined in
the statute.' In the landmark case of Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer,8
however, the Texas Supreme Court interpreted "estate of the parties" to include only the spouses' community property." The Eggemeyer decision made it clear section 3.63 did not authorize the
trial court, in a decree of divorce or annulment, to divide property
acquired by the spouses while domiciled in a non-community property jurisdiction.
In 1981, the 67th Legislature amended section 3.63 by adding
subsection (b), discussed below.' The amendment was expressly
made applicable to all divorce or annulment hearings held on or
after September 1, 1981. 6 Section 3.63(b) now requires the court, in
a decree of divorce or annulment, to order a division of real and
personal property, wherever situated, that was: (1) acquired by either spouse while domiciled elsewhere and that would have been
community property had the spouse who acquired the property
been domiciled in Texas at the time of the acquisition; or (2) acquired by either spouse in exchange for property described in sec7
tion 3.63(b)(1).
The amendment, which in some respects merely codifies a practice already known to Texas courts, 8 raises important federal and
Id.

2. See 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 888, § 3.63, at 2725.
3. 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977) (noted in 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 331 (1977)).
4. See Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. 1977). "The only 'estate of

the parties' is community property." Id. at 139.
5. See 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 712, § 1, at 2656.
6. See id. at 2657. "This Act takes effect September 1, 1981, and applies only to suits
for divorce or annulment in which a hearing on the issue of divorce or annulment has not
been held before that date." Id. at 2657.
7. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982). Section (b)(2) of this statute is
perhaps not as clear a statement as could be desired. The deletion of the word "and" might
make the meaning clearer.
8. Texas courts traditionally have looked to the status of the property at the time of
acquisition in the jurisdiction where acquired to determine its character upon divorce in
Texas. This designation as separate or community was prior to publication of the opinion in
Campbell v. Campbell, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 391 (June 4, 1980), opinion withdrawn, 24 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 84, 84 (November 22, 1980), tempered by the perceived discretion of the court to
make an equitable division of personal property. See Muns v. Muns, 567 S.W.2d 563, 566
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ); Whittenburg v. Whittenburg, 523 S.W.2d 797, 798
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ); Gaulding v. Gaulding, 503 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.
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state law issues that merit discussion. In this article, the constitutionality of the amendment and questions which may arise in its
application are explored.
I.

POSSIBLE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Section 3.63(b) is very similar to a California statute,' the antecedents of which date back to 1917.10 A brief history of the California experience will serve to bring some of the federal constitutional
issues into focus.
In 1917 California adopted a law which declared that realty situated in California and personal property, wherever situated, which
was acquired during marriage while the spouses were domiciled in
another jiurisdiction would become community property upon the
spouses' establishing their domicile in California." This rule controlled in the event that property would not have been either
spouse's separate property if acquired while the spouses were domiciled in California."2 In the case of In re Thornton's Estate,18 the
California Supreme Court declared this statute unconstitutional,
finding it altered vested property rights arising out of a spouse's
acquisition of property in another state, in derogation of his privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States.1 4 The court
Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, no writ).
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4803 (West 1970). An analogous statute has been adopted in Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-318 (Supp. 1981-82), and was discussed in In re Marriage of
Furimsky, 595 P.2d 662, 663 (Ariz. 1979). By the same token, some common law jurisdictions have attempted to address, in their divorce statutes, the division of community property, a type of property alien to their jurisprudence. The statute in Hawaii, which is not a
community property state, provides for the court, in a divorce, to divide the estate of the
parties, "whether community, joint or separate." HAWAII REv. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1981).
The statute in Nevada, also not a community property state, allows the court, in a divorce,
to make an equitable distribution of, inter alia, the "community property of the parties."
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150 (1979).
10. For a detailed review of the successive statutory changes and court decisions involving the California law on this topic, see Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897, 899-900, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 99-100 (1965). See generally In re Miller, 187 P.2d 722 (Cal. 1947); I. BAXTER,
MARITAL PROPERTY § 23.3, at 344 (1973); Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 391 (1967).
11. 1917 Cal. Stat. ch. 581, § 1, at 827.
12. Id. at 287.
13. 33 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1934).
14. Id. at 2-3. The court was referring to the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment, which reads in part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . . " U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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also held that to take the property of one person and to transfer it
to another, simply because of a change of citizenship and domicile,
was a deprivation of property without due process of law.15
In 1961 the California legislature introduced the concept of
"quasi-community property," which it defined as all personal property, wherever situated, and all real property situated in California,
acquired during marriage by a spouse while domiciled in another
jurisdiction, that would have been community property if acquired
while that spouse was domicled in California.16 At the same time,
California courts were given authority to divide both community
and "quasi-community property" in a decree of divorce.17
The constitutionality of the 1961 enactment was challenged in
the divorce case of Addison v. Addison. 8 In Addison, the Supreme
Court of California expressed serious doubts as to the correctness
of Thornton. 9 The court distinguished Thornton on the ground
that the statute invalidated by Thornton had altered property
rights by the crossing of the boundary into California, while the
1961 enactment became operative only upon rendition of a decree
of divorce.20 The court rejected the husband's complaint of deprivation of property without due process of law, finding the state of
current domicile had sufficient interest in a divorce pending in its
courts to justify the exercise of its police power in altering the
vested property rights of divorcing spouses.2 The court further rejected the argument that the statute violated the privileges and
immunities clauses found in the fourteenth amendment and sec15. In re Thornton's Estate, 33 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1934). At this point the court was referring to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which reads in part: "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; accord Douglas v. Douglas, 125 P. 796, 797 (Idaho 1912).
16. 1961 Cal. Gen. Laws, ch. 638, § 2, at 1838.
17. Id. at 1839.
18. 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
19. Id. at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
20. Id. at 901-02, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02; accord Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496,
502 (N.J. 1974).
21. See Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897, 903, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1965). But see
Roesch v. Roesch, 147 Cal. Rptr. 586, 593 (Ct. App. 1978) (where husband had lived in
California only seven months after separating from wife and children, who remained in
Pennsylvania-the marital domicile for almost entire marriage-California did not have sufficient interest to warrant application of California's quasi-community property statute in
husband's California divorce proceeding), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979).
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tion 2 of article IV of the United States Constitution.22 The California court also dismissed the husband's final contention that the
law had been applied retroactively. Since the statute was given effect by a decree of divorce rendered after the effective date of the
statute, the court
determined the statute had been applied pro23
only.
spectively
In 1970 the California legislature broadened its definition of
"quasi-community property" to include all property, wherever situated, acquired by a spouse while domiciled in another jurisdiction, which would have been community had the acquiring spouse
been domiciled in California at the time of acquisition.2 ' The
description of property set out in this California statute is very
similar to the language in section 3.63(b)(1) and (2). The term
"quasi-community property", however, does not appear in Section
3.63(b)(1) and (2). Instead, the Texas statute merely describes the
property to be divided, without labelling it. Nevertheless, because
of the similarity between the California and Texas provisions, the
constitutional analysis used by the court in Addison could be applied with equal force to section 3.63(b).
A further analogy can be drawn between section 3.63(b) and
statutes recently adopted in many common law jurisdictions giving
trial courts the power to make an "equitable distribution" of property in a marital dissolution proceeding.' 5 Because certain such
22. Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897, 903, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1965); see also U.S.
IV, § 2; id. amend XIV, § 1.
23. See Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897, 904 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104.But see In re Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371, 1377 n.10, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 433 n.10 (1976) (refuting the
Addison court's disclaimer that the statute had not been applied retroactively).
24. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4803 (West 1970). The significant change was the inclusion of real
property situated outside California.
25. All but five of the common law states in the United States have statutes providing
for equitable distribution of property on divorce. These five exceptions are Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
AND ANTE-NupTIAL CONTRACTS § 31, at 35-57 (1981 Supp.). Both Florida and South Carolina, however, by virtue of state decisional law, allow a form of equitable division. E.g.
Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 1980); see Freed & Foster, Divorce In
The Fifty States: An Overview As Of August 1, 1981, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) No. 49, at 405657 (Oct. 20, 1981). West Virginia allows transfer of title, upon divorce, of items of personalty
with short usable life, such as an automobile, as equitable compensation for "loss of the
advantages of the marriage state." See Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709, 711 (W. Va.
1981). Some statutory schemes define the term "marital property," and then provide that
"marital property" is divisible on divorce. Examples of such "marital property" statutes are
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214 (1962); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-113 (1974 & Supp. 1980); Del.
CONST. art.
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statutes allow the divestiture of title to property on divorce to a
degree previously unknown in these common law jurisdictions,
some of these laws have been attacked on constitutional grounds."
Traditionally in common law jurisdictions, the court, in a marital
dissolution proceeding, was required to award property to the
spouse holding title to same.'7 Since a husband was the exclusive
owner of his own wages and the things bought with them, 8 the
Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1513 (Supp. 1981); I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 40, § 503 (1980); Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 403.190 (Baldwin Supp. 1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 722-A (1981); Minn.
Stat. §§ 518.54, .58 (Supp. 1981); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.330 (Supp. 1982); N.C. Gen. Stat. §
50-20 (1981 Supp.); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236B(5) (West Supp. 1981-82); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
23, § 401(d) (Purdon 1981-82). The "marital property" statutes are patterned after the nowsuperceded section 307 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, as amended in 1971. See
Zillert v. Zillert, 395 A.2d 1152, 1154-55 (Me. 1978). Most of the other statutory schemes
specify the types of property that can be divided, without labelling them. See generally
Fleck, HistoricalImpact And PracticalApplications of Alternatives A & B of The Uniform
Marriage And Divorce Act as Incorporated in The Illinois Marriage And Dissolution of
Marriage Act, TAx, FINANCIAL & ESTATz PLANNING DEvELoPMEwrs IN FAMILY LAW 2 (1981).
The Maryland statute, however, directs the court, in a divorce or annulment proceeding, to
determine the value of the "marital property" and then to grant a monetary award to one
spouse against the other if an adjustment of the equities is desired. The court may not,
however, transfer the ownership of property from one spouse to the other. See MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-6A-03 to -05 (1980).
26. See, e.g., Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1387-89 (Il1. 1978) (dismissing
arguments statute violated constitutional prohibitions against impairment of contractural
obligations, denied due process, and equal protection); Fournier v. Fournier, 376 A.2d 100,
101-02 (Me. 1977) (rejecting argument that applying statute to property acquired before
effective date of statute violated fourteenth amendment's due process clause); Rothman v.
Rothman, 320 A.2d 496, 503 (N.J. 1974) (holding statute did not amount to deprivation of
property without due process); see also Husband T.N.S. v. Wife A.N.S., 407 A.2d 1045, 1048
(Del. 1979); Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Valladares v. Valladares, 438 N.Y.S.2d 810, 815-16 (App. Div. 1981). Trial courts in Pennsylvania have differed as to the constitutionality of retroactive application of that state's equitable distribution statute adopted in 1980. See Retroactivity of Pennsylvania's New Law, 1 FAIRSHARE
No. 8, at 21 (Aug. 1981).
27. See Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1387 (11. 1978); Carter v. Carter,
419 A.2d 1018, 1020 (Me. 1980); Paul W. v. Margaret W., 8 PAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3013, 3013
(Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1981); Allerbach & Jenner, Historical and PracticeNotes, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, § 503, at 454 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
28. See Huston v. Colonial Trust Co., 266 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (husband owned his wages under common law which existed in Pennsylvania); Pechstein v. Pechstein, 174 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1943,
no writ) (wife had no interest in husband's wages under common law which existed in
Utah); cf. Mitchim v. Mitchim, 509 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974) (retirement benefits earned during marriage, while spouses were domiciled in common law state,
belonged to the employee spouse), rev'd on other grounds, 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975);.
Gaulding v. Gaulding, 503 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, no writ) (wife
had no community interest in portion of husband's retirement benefits attributable to em-
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husband usually received most of the property upon dissolution of
the marriage.2s Under the newer equitable distribution statutes,
however, the trial court in a marital dissolution proceeding is permitted to equitably divide property acquired during marriage from
certain sources, regardless of how title was taken.' 0 Property made
divisible by these statutes, denominated "marital property" in
some jurisdictions, is usually defined in terms analagous to community property, i.e., property acquired during marriage by other
than gift, devise, or descent.'1
In the divorce case of Kujawinski v. Kujawinski," the Supreme
Court of Illinois addressed the question of whether a "marital
property" statute adopted by the Illinois Legislature deprived the
husband, without due process of law, of property rights which had
vested in him prior to the effective date of the statute. The court
held that the statute did not purport to affect the rights of the
husband to own and enjoy property during the marriage." The act
merely described certain types of property as "marital property"
and provided for Illinois courts to equitably divide such property
upon termination of the marriage.' The statute was found to be a
valid exercise of the state's police power to "create a system of
property division upon dissolution of marriage that is more equitable than that which previously existed.""s Therefore, the Illinois
court reasoned, the statute afforded due process of law. In rejecting
the husband's argument that the new divorce law could constituployment in Tennessee and Kentucky); Orr v. Pope, 400 S.W.2d 614, 616-17 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1966, no writ) (land in Texas acquired by husband while residing in Oregon
held to be his separate property under the common law in effect in Oregon).
29. Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Paul W. v. Margaret

W., 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3013, 3013 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1981); Muns v. Muns, 567
S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
30. See authorities cited in note 25 supra. Regarding the reduced significance of title,
see In re Marriage of Howard, 600 P.2d 93, 94 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979) and In re Marriage of
Fleming, 400 N.E.2d 625, 627 (I11.
Ct. App. 1980).
31. See statutes cited in note 25 supra. The Maine Supreme Court commented: "We
have previously noted that our marital property statute isbased upon 'the fundamental
conception of marriage, having its roots in community property law, as a partnership or
shared enterprise.'" Grant v. Grant, 424 A.2d 139, 144 (Me. 1981) (quoting Carter v. Carter,
419 A.2d 1018, 1022 (Me. 1980)).
32. 376 N.E.2d 1382 (Ill. 1978).
33. Id. at 1386.
34. Id. at 1386-87.
35. Id. at 1388.
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tionally be applied only to property acquired after the effective
date of the statute, the court observed that such a rule would delay
the impact of the legislation "for at least a generation."3 The
court concluded that the state's interest in applying the statute
retrospectively greatly outweighted the husband's asserted property interest,3 7 citing a New Jersey Supreme Court case" and a
Missouri Court of Appeals case 9 upholding similar statutes on
similar grounds.
The New York equitable distribution statute was challenged as
violating the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of
0
This constitutional chalcontracts, in Valladares v. Valladares.4
lenge was rejected on the grounds that marriage is not a contract
within the meaning of the prohibitions in the United States Constitution against the impairment of contractual obligations, and
further that the marital dissolution law did not authorize the impairment of contractual rights of third parties.4 1 The contract argument has been rejected in other states where it has been raised
as well.' 2
The Valladares court also considered the argument that the new
marital dissolution law denied equal protection of the laws because
it divided married persons into two classes: those who commenced
dissolution proceedings prior to the effective date of the statute
and those who commenced their dissolution actions later.43 This
argument was rejected with the observation that new legislation
usually creates two classes, i.e., those to whom the statute applies
and those to whom it does not." The court further held that the
New York Legislature had a rational basis for using the date of
commencement of the marital dissolution proceeding as the basis

36. Id. at 1388.
37. Id. at 1388.
38. Id. at 1388 (citing Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496 (N.J. 1974)).
39. Id. at 1388 (citing Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)).
40. 438 N.Y.S.2d 810 (App. Div. 1981).
41. Id. at 816; accord Carner v. Carner, 444 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (App. Div. 1981).
42. See, e.g., Gluck v. Gluck, 435 A.2d 35, 37 (Conn. 1980); Kujawinski v. Kujawinski,
376 N.E.2d 1382, 1387 (I1. 1978); Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977); see also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211-14 (1888); In re Marriage of Franks, 542
P.2d 845, 850 (Colo. 1975); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
43. Valladares v. Valladares, 438 N.Y.S.2d 810, 816-17 (App. Div. 1981).
44. Id. at 817.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol13/iss3/2

8

Stewart and Orsinger: Fitting a Round Peg into a Square Hole: Section 3.63, Texas Famil

1982]

SECTION 3.63

for determining applicability of the new law.'5
In the case of In re Marriage of Thompson,"6 an Illinois appellate court rejected an argument that the Illinois "equitable distrubution" statute denied equal protection of the laws by treating
divorcing spouses differently from spouses who continue to be married. The husband complained that a spouse being divorced is subject to the divestiture of property described in the statute, while a
spouse who continues to be married is not.'7 Citing Kujawinski,
the court said that the legislature may differentiate between persons similarly situated as long as the classification bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose.' 8 The disparate
treatment was deemed justified by the major economic and social
impact of marital dissolution on the spouses."e
In the case of In re Marriage of Thornqvist,50 another Illinois
appellate court considered the related argument that the Illinois
statute violated equal protection clauses of the United States and
Illinois Constitutions by treating married persons differently from
unmarried persons. The husband complained of the statute's direction that marital property be divided with reference to the spouses'
future incomes, while this factor was not considered in litigating
the rights of unmarried individuals. 1 Quoting Kujawinski and
Thompson, the court rejected this constitutional attack.2
Like the California "quasi-community property" statute and the
"equitable distribution" statutes described above, section 3.63(b)
does not impair the right of a spouse to own and control, during
marriage, property which "belonged" to him under the law of his
domicile at the time the property was acquired. Section 3.63(b)
merely requires the Texas court, in a divorce or annulment proceeding, to divide, in a manner which is just and right, property
acquired by the spouses while domiciled in another jurisdiction, if
that property would have been community property had the ac45. Id. at 817.
46. 398 N.E.2d 17 (I1. Ct. App. 1979).
47. Id. at 21.

48. Id. at 21; see Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1389 (I1. 1978).
49. In re Marriage of Thompson, 398 N.E.2d 17, 22 (I1. Ct. App. 1979).
50. 399 N.E.2d 176 (I1. Ct. App. 1979).
51. Id. at 180.

52. Id. at 180; see Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1389 (Ill. 1978); In re
Marriage of Thompson, 398 N.E.2d 17, 21 (IIH. Ct. App. 1979).
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quiring spouse been domiciled in Texas at the time of acquisition.
The experience of other states with analagous statutes suggests
that section 3.63(b) does not violate the federal Constitution.
II.

POSSIBLE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

State constitutional issues may also arise in connection with section 3.63(b). In dicta contained in the majority opinion in Eggemeyer,3 two constitutional problems were raised by the trial
court's attempted divestiture of the husband's separate property
under what is now section 3.63(a).' 4 The first problem related to
the inability of the Texas Legislature to expand, by statutory enactment, the definition of separate property beyond that set out in
section 15, article XVI, of the Texas Constitution."5 The second
problem concerned the lack of a sufficient justifying public purpose
to support the taking of one spouse's separate property and awarding it to the other in a decree of divorce.'
It would seem that the first constitutional argument raised in
Eggemeyer, the improper expansion of the constitutional definition
of separate property, should not invalidate section 3.63(b). It is apparent the statutory provision does not, on its face, expand or restrict the definition of separate property set out in the Texas Con53. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
54. Id. at 139; see TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982). The language of
this subsection comprised the entire body of section 3.63 prior to the 1981 amendment. See
1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 888, § 3.63, at 2725.
55. See Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977). The court noted:
Section 15, article XVI of the Texas Constitution declares that a wife's property,
owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise,
or descent shall be the separate property of the wife. By reason of legislation, the
husband's property is classified the same way. If one spouse's separate property may
by divorce decree be changed from the separate property of the one spouse into the
separate property of the other, there is a type of separate property which is not embraced within the constitutional definition of the term.
Id. at 140 (footnotes omitted).
56. See id. at 140-41. After noting the constitutional impropriety of taking one person's
property for the benefit of another private person without some justifying public purpose,
the court addressed the due process claim of the husband in the following manner:
There is no contention that the taking of Homer's separate property and its transfer
to Virginia is justified by a benefit to the public welfare. The taking was not grounded
upon the police power; consequently, the taking from Homer would not have been a
constitutional act even if the legislature had expressly authorized the divesture of one
person's property and its vesting in another person.
Id. at 140-41; see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
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stitution. In fact, the statute does not in any way define property
acquired by a spouse while domiciled in another jurisdiction; section 3.63(b) merely requires the court to divide a specified type of
property in a decree of divorce or annulment. The concern voiced
in Eggemeyer, however, did not involve express definitions. The
concern, rather, was that legislation granting the courts of this
state the power to divest one spouse of separate property and to
award it to the other in a divorce would implicitly create a new
category of separate property, i.e., separate property acquired by
one spouse, through a decree of divorce, from the separate estate of
the other spouse. The court found this result was beyond the
power of the legislature.57 The responsive argument to this expressed concern is that section 3.63(b) does not violate the prohibition described in Eggemeyer because the property which may be
divested under section 3.63(b) by necessity cannot be separate
property, as that term is defined in the Texas Constitution. Article
XVI, section 15, of the Texas Constitution, defines separate property as "[a]il property, both real and personal, of a spouse owned
or claimed before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift,
devise or descent. . . . ," Since section 3.63(b), by its very terms,
authorizes only a division of property that would have been community in character had it been acquired by the spouse while domiciled in Texas, section 3.63(b) does not violate the policy, announced in Eggemeyer, against divesting a spouse of property
owned or claimed before marriage, or acquired during marriage by
gift, devise, or descent.
Some cases have held that the property which "belongs" to a
spouse under the laws of a common law jurisdiction will be considered to be that spouse's separate property upon the spouse's
adopting a Texas domicile." An equivalence has therefore been es57. See Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977).
58. TEx. CONsT. art. XVI, § 15. The constitution also includes in its definition of separate property any property set aside to each spouse in a written partition or exchange agreement. See id.
59. See, e.g., Gaulding v. Gaulding, 503 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1973, no writ); Orr v. Pope, 400 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, no writ);
Pechstein v. Pechatein, 174 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1943, no writ);
see also Gaudion v. Gaudion, 601 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ);
Mitchim v. Mitchim, 509 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975); Huston v. Colonial Trust Co., 266 S.W.2d 231, 234
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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tablished by Texas courts between the concept of "title ownership"
in common law jurisdictions and the concept of "separate property" in Texas. It has been argued that the concepts are not, in
fact, equivalent.60 The correctness of this view may well be answered by the Texas Supreme Court in a case which it presently
has under advisement.1 If the equivalence is established, then the
protections of the Eggemeyer decision may extend to such property and make the application of section 3.63(b) to such property
unconstitutional. A similar question arises in connection with
property, acquired by a spouse while domiciled in a community
property jurisdiction other than Texas, which was the spouse's separate property under the laws of such domicile. Is that property
60. Coote v. Coote, 592 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (Hughes, J., dissenting); Sampson, Common Law Property In A Texas Divorce: After
Eggemeyer, the Deluge?, 42 TEX. B.J. 131, 133-34 (1979); accord, Rau v. Rau, 432 P.2d 910,
913-14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967); Berle v. Berle, 546 P.2d 407, 409 (Idaho 1976).
61. Writ of error was granted in Cameron v. Cameron, 608 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ granted) on the following points:
Point One
The Honorable Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that the military
retirement benefits and United States savings bonds, which were acquired in
common law states and would have there been subject to division and/or alimony
in lieu thereof, were not and are not subject to division and partial award to
Petitioner under Texas law.
POINT THREE

The Honorable Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that the military
retirement benefits, acquired in common law states, are the separate property,
under Texas law, of Paul Archibald Cameron, Respondent herein.
POINT FIVE

The Honorable Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that the income from the
military retirement benefits was not subject to division and partial award to
Petitioner.
Cameron v. Cameron, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 415 (May 23, 1981). Even though the recent opinion in McCarty v. McCarty, -U.S.-,
101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1981), holding
that federal law preempts the power of state courts to award military retirement benefits to
the non-employee spouse on divorce, would defeat Mrs. Cameron's points as to division of
military retirement benefits, an issue still remains as to the holding of the court of appeals
that United States savings bonds acquired with funds withheld from Mr. Cameron's military pay while residing in common law jurisdictions were his separate property, and, therefore, not subject to division upon divorce because of the holdings in Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. 1977) and Campbell v. Campbell, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
391, 392-93 (June 4, 1980), opinion withdrawn, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 84, 84 (November 22,
1980).
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sufficiently equivalent to the Texas brand of "separate property"
that the protections of the Eggemeyer decision extend to it, even if
the property would have been community if acquired while the
spouse was domiciled in Texas?"" If so, then the divestiture of
property pursuant to section 3.63(b) to such property would be
unconstitutional.
The second constitutional principle invoked by the majority in
Eggemeyer to deny the court, in a divorce proceeding, the power to
divide separate property was the prohibition in the Texas Constitution against the taking of vested property rights without due
course of law. es Just as with separate property, title to property
coming within the scope of section 3.63(b), in many instances, may
be held by one spouse to the exclusion of the other. Where a decree of divorce or annulment divests that spouse of title to such
property and awards it to the other, there is clearly a taking of
solely-owned property. If the law of Texas is that no sufficient justifying public purpose exists to support the taking of property
owned exclusively by one spouse and awarding it to the other, then
the application of section 3.63(b) to certain types of property may
be held unconstitutional.
It should be recognized that most common law jurisdictions of
the United States do not afford the spouse who holds title to property the kind of protection from governmental interference that
Eggemeyer affords the holder of separate property in Texas. In
such jurisdictions, property acquired by a spouse during marriage
is always subject to the power of the courts, on dissolution of the
marriage, to dispose of that property in accordance with both state
and federal law." This inherent disability arising from the marital
62. In California, for example, the rents, issues, and profits of separate property are
also separate property. See CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (West 1970). The earnings and
accumulations of either spouse while living separate and apart from the other are separate

property as well. See id. § 5118 (West Supp. 1981). Under Texas law, such income would be
community property. See Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1975).

63. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. 1977). The court's statement of this principle is quoted in note 55 supra.
64. E.g., Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1388 (Il1. 1978) ("Plaintiff had no
reasonable expectation, under the preexisting law, that his property was immune from

transfer to his spouse upon termination of the marriage."); accord United States v. Davis,
370 U.S. 65, 66 (1962) (Delaware law provided wife with inchoate rights in her husband's
property, including rights to intestate succession, dower, and a share of his property upon
divorce); Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255, 257 (10th Cir.) (Kansas law conferred upon
wife, on filing of divorce suit, right to have court marshall all of the parties' property, re-
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status limits the degree to which a spouse's ownership rights vest
in the property he or she acquires during marriage. Cast in this
light, the relevant question is not, therefore, whether section
3.63(b) allows a Texas court to deprive a spouse of rights he may
have had, under the laws of another jurisdiction, to own and control property during the marriage. Rather, the question is whether
the power of a Texas court applying section 3.63(b) in a divorce or
annulment proceeding so far exceeds the power of a court of an
earlier domicile applying the marital dissolution laws of that state,
that a Texas court's division of property acquired by a spouse
while domiciled in the former jurisdiction is unconstitutional. At
least in those instances where section 3.63(b) is as restrictive, if not
more restrictive, of the court's power in a divorce or annulment
proceeding as the law of the earlier domicile, it can be argued that
no impairment of rights occurs. It might also be noted that Texas
is the only state in the United States which categorically prohibits
court-ordered alimony. 6 1 The fact that, by divorcing in Texas, a
spouse eliminates the risk that he and his assets could be bound to
support the other spouse after the divorce alone might lead to the
conclusion that the marital dissolution laws of Texas interfere with
"vested" rights to a lesser degree than the law of the earlier domigardless of ownership or acquisition, and to divide it in a just and reasonable manner), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974); In re Marriage of Engel, 629 P.2d 3878, 405 (Or. Ct. App. 1981)
(spouses' reciprocal equitable right to share in the marital estate is a burden on each party's
separate estate); see Collins v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211, 211-12 (10th Cir. 1969) (under
Oklahoma law, wife has vested interest in husband's property conceptually similar to community property); In re Questions Submitted by the United States District Court, 517 P.2d
1331, 1332 (Colo. 1974) (wife's interest in marital property is a "species of common ownership"); Valladares v. Valladares, 438 N.Y.S.2d 810, 816 (App. Div. 1981) (New York's new
divorce law did not impair vested rights of husband because the common law has traditionally required that the court, on dissolution of marriage, "fix support obligations and order
one spouse to relinquish property to the other"); cf. Rau v. Rau, 432 P.2d 910, 912 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1967) (property acquired by spouse while domiciled in a common law state, when
brought to Arizona, remained divisible on divorce in accordance with law of prior domicile);
Berle v. Berle, 546 P.2d 407, 410 (Idaho 1976) (property acquired by husband while domiciled in New Jersey, when brought to Idaho, carried with it the wife's incidents of ownership
in same, including the power of the New Jersey court to divide same on divorce); Hughes v.
Hughes, 573 P.2d 1194, 1201 (N.M. 1978) (property acquired by husband while domiciled in
Iowa, when brought to New Mexico, retained all of the wife's incidents of ownership, claims,
rights, and legal regulations under Iowa law, including the power of an Iowa court to divide
same on divorce).
65. Freed & Foster, Divorce In The Fifty States: An Overview As Of August 1, 1981, 7
FAM. L. REP.(BNA) No. 49, at 4059 (Oct. 20, 1981).
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cile." Moreover, where the earlier jurisdiction is one whose courts
have expressly ruled that property acquired by its domiciliaries is
not vested to the degree that it becomes constitutionally protected
from even radical changes in its own divorce laws, 7 there is little
reason to suggest that Texas should afford the property such protection when the change in law is occasioned by removal of the
spouse to this state.
A related question is whether Texas' constitutional prohibition
against enactment of retroactive laws might invalidate section
3.63(b).6 8 A law is impermissibly retroactive "if it takes away or
impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a
new obligation, imposes a new duty, or adopts a new disability in
respect to transactions or considerations already passed.""9 When
the statute is remedial,7 0 however, and does not destroy vested
7
rights,7 1 the constitutional prohibition does not apply. '
66. The idea that property division and alimony are but different faces of the same coin
is recognized in Valladares v. Valladares, 438 N.Y.S.2d 810 (App. Div. 1981), where the
court said: "Upon dissolution of the marriage, the common law has traditionally required
that the court fix support obligations and order one spouse to relinquish property to the
other, whether it be in the form of alimony or in some other form." Id. at 816 (App. Div.
1981).
67. See Fournier v. Fournier, 376 A.2d 100, 101-02 (Me. 1977); Corder v. Corder, 546
S.W.2d 798, 802 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496, 503 (N.J. 1974).
68. Tex. Const. art. I, § 16 states: "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive
law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made." Id.
69. French v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 591 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1979, no writ); see McCain v. Yost, 155 Tex. 174, 178, 284 S.W.2d 898, 900 (1955); French v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 591 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no writ);
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Kountze, 543 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
70. A remedial statute has been variously defined as a "law introducing a new regulation for the advancement of the public welfare or conducive of the public good," Board of
Ins. Comm'rs v. Great S. Life Ins. Co., 150 Tex. 258, 266, 239 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1951); a law
which affects "only the remedy or procedure," or that "pertains to practice and procedure,"
and that "is the legal machinery by which the substantive law is made effective," Harrision
v. Cox, 524 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); a law which
"supplies defects, and abridges superfluities in the former law," Falls v. Key, 278 S.W. 893,
896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1925, writ dism'd); a law "prescribing or regulating the use
of the courts of the land for the enforcement of rights and obligations arising out of contracts," Chapin v. Frank, 236 S.W. 1006,1009 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1921), rev'd on
other grounds sub. nor., Frank v. State Bank & Trust Co., 10 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1924, judgmt adopted); and as a law adopted to remedy the condition and prevent the
hardship and injustice existing under a prior statute, O'Connor v. State, 71 S.W. 409, 411
(Tex. Civ. App. 1902), rev'd on other grounds, 96 Tex. 484, 73 S.W. 1041 (1903).
71. In City of Dallas v. Trammell, 129 Tex. 150, 101 S.W.2d 1009 (1937), the Texas

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 13 [2022], No. 3, Art. 2

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:477

It is arguable that to apply section 3.63(b) to property acquired

by a spouse prior to the effective date of the statute is to give the
statute retroactive effect. Courts of other states facing the question
generally have agreed that such an application is retroactive.7"
Supreme Court approvingly quoted the Supreme Court of Illinois as follows:
A right to be within the protection of the Constitution, must be a vested right. It
must be something more than a mere expectancy based upon an anticipated continuance of an existing law. If before rights become vested in particular individuals the
convenience of the State induces the amendment or repeal, such individuals have no
cause to complain.
Id. at 161, 101 S.W.2d at 1014. In DuPre v. DuPre, 271 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1954, no writ), the court observed:
While it is true that vested rights may not be destroyed or impaired, "[a] right
cannot be considered a vested right, unless it is something more than such a mere
expectation as may be based upon an anticipated continuance of the present general
laws; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of exemption of a demand made by another.
Id. at 831; accord, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Richardelle, 528 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (legislature's repeal of statute imposing strict
liability on parents for malicious acts of their children not unconstitutionally retroactive as
to a person who suffered such injury before the statute's repeal, but who did not file suit
until after such repeal, since there cannot be a vested right in a mere rule of law). See
generally Coulter v. Melady, 489 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (court rejected claim by relatives of intestate decedent that statute prohibiting
filing of annulment proceedings after death of a spouse was unconstitutionally retroactive,
since statute became effective prior to woman's death when the relatives' interest in property was nothing more than an expectancy), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973); DuPre v.
DuPre, 271 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954, no writ) (statute increasing age
until which a parent must support his child from sixteen to eighteen years was not unconstitutionally retroactive as to divorced father of child who had not yet reached age sixteen).
72. See Pratt v. Story, 530 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ);
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Richardelle, 528 S.W.2d 280, 283-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.]), rev'd on other grounds, 526 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. 1975).
73. Accord Ford v. Ford, 605 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 616 S.W.2d 3 (Ark. 1981); In re Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371, 1377 n.10, 128
Cal. Rptr. 427, 433 n.10 (1976); Stevens v. Stevens, 390 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Me. 1978); see
Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d
496, 499 (N.J. 1974); Valladares v. Valladares, 438 N.Y.S.2d 810, 815-16 (App. Div. 1981). In
In re Marriageof Furimsky, the Arizona Supreme Court found that state's "quasi-community property" statute not to apply retroactively because of the failure of the legislature to
indicate its intention of retroactive application. See In re Marriage of Furimsky, 595 P.2d
662, 663 (Ariz. 1979). The Arizona Legislature subsequently responded to Furimsky by
amending the statute to expressly provide for "retrospective" operation. 1980 Ariz. Sess.
Laws, ch. 113, § 7. Contra Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897, 904, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104
(1965); In re Marriage of Walton, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472, 477 (Ct. App. 1972); Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496, 503 (N.J. 1974). The finding of the Addison court that the statute was
not being applied retroactively was based on the rationale that the legislative act "neither
creates nor alters rights except on divorce or separate maintenance," and since the divorce

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol13/iss3/2

16

Stewart and Orsinger: Fitting a Round Peg into a Square Hole: Section 3.63, Texas Famil

1982]

SECTION 3.63

Nonetheless, in most instances, such statutes have been held not to
violate state constitutional prohibitions against retroactive laws,
usually on the grounds either that the statutes were remedial and
did not disturb vested rights, or that overriding public interest justified retroactive application, regardless of the rights involved."4
Even were this application deemed valid, it could be argued further that section 3.63(b) could not constitutionally be applied to
divorce or annulment proceedings initiated prior to the effective
date of the statute. A similar argument was rejected by the Supreme Court of California in Addison, which held that the law at
the time of judgment was controlling.75 Another argument in this
same vein could be made that to apply section 3.63(b) to property
acquired by a spouse before he became subject to Texas property
laws constitutes retroactive application of the law. No authorities
involved there was granted after the enactment, the application was prospective. See Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897, 904, 43 Cal. Rptr.. 97, 104 (1965). This determination by the
court was quoted approvingly in Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496, 503 (N.J. 1974), but
was later repudiated by the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Bouquet, 546
P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976). The Bouquet court found that the statute, in fact, had
been applied retroactively in Addison. See In re Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371, 1377
n.10, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 433 n.10 (1976).
74. E.g., Husband T.N.S. v. Wife A.M.S., 407 A.2d 1045, 1048 (Del. 1979); Kujawinski
v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1388 (Il1. 1978); Fournier v. Fournier, 376 A.2d 100, 102
(Me. 1977). In the case of In re Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427
(1976), the California Supreme Court went a step further by upholding the retroactive application of a statutory amendment which deprived a wife of a community interest in her
husband's earnings after separation. Prior to the amendment, the earnings of the wife after
separation were her separate property although the earnings of the husband were community property. After the amendment, the earnings of both spouses after separation were
separate property. On the basis of police power, the court held the amendment governed all
property rights that had not been finally adjudicated by a judgment from which the appeal
time had lapsed. See id. at 1378, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
75. Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897, 904, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1965); accord
Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1386 (Ill. 1978) (Illinois equitable division statute properly applied, in accordance with its terms, to actions commenced prior to its effective date with respect to issues on which judgment had not been entered); Morse v. Morse,
571 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Mont. 1977) (proper to apply Montana's equitable division statute to a
divorce tried prior to its effective date but in which judgment was entered after its effective
date); cf. Husband B. v. Wife B., 396 A.2d 169, 171 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978) (justifying application of new law allowing post-divorce alimony in divorce proceeding filed and tried prior
to effective date of statute; rights of parties to alimony not fixed until entry of decree, which
occurred after effective date of statute); Gibbons v. Gibbons, 432 A.2d 80, 82 (N.J. 1981)
(statutory amendment removing gifts from category of equitably distributable property correctly applied retroactively to action instituted, tried, and on appeal at time amendment
took effect).
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could be found discussing the applicability of the prohibition
against retroactive laws, as contained in the various state constitutions, to a situation involving a change of domicile.7
Although Texas laws establishing new grounds for divorce, and
eliminating defenses to divorce, have been held to be remedial,"
no Texas authorities have been found expressly holding the laws
relating to property division upon divorce or annulment to be remedial. 78 Courts of other states, however, have held their laws pertaining to division of property upon divorce to be remedial and,
therefore, immune from attack under those states' constitutional
prohibitions against retroactive laws.7 9 If the marital dissolution
76. An argument that such a statute could not be constitutionally applied to persons
married before the effective date of the statute has been rejected. See Carner v. Carner, 444
N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (App. Div. 1981).
77. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no
writ) (abolition of defenses of recrimination and adultery not unconstitutionally retroactive
since spouse had no vested right in these defenses); accord In re Marriage of Walton, 104
Cal. Rptr. 472, 476 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Buchholz v. Buchholz, 248 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Neb.
1976). Chalmers v. Chalmers, 320 A.2d 478, 483 (N.J. 1974); Gleason v. Gleason, 256 N.E.2d
513, 517 n.5 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970).
78. But see Gowin v. Gowin, 292 S.W. 211, 214 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt
adopted) (state, although, not bound to do so, may establish the remedy of divorce and,
contemporaneously, an adjustment of property rights); Falls v. Key, 278 S.W. 893, 896 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1925, writ dism'd) (statute requiring husband's signature for wife to
convey separate realty not unconstitutionally retroactive as to land owned by wife prior to
the adoption of the statute; wife had no vested right in the procedure necessary for her to
dispose of land).
79. See Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1388 (I1. 1978); Corder v. Corder,
546 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496, 499 (N.J.
1974); see also Dishon v. Oliver, 402 A.2d 1292, 1294 (Me. 1979) ("statutes providing procedures for the division of property upon divorce are remedial in nature, and the Legislature
may change these procedures without offending constitutional principles."); Hopkins v.
Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ) (state legislature has broad power to regulate and change conditions for obtaining a divorce and to
amend laws which govern marital relationship); State Bd. of Regis. For Prof. Eng'rs v.
Wichita Eng'g Co., 504 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ refd n.r.e.)
(constitutional rules against retroactive laws must yield to a state's right to safeguard the
public safety and welfare). But see Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex.
1977) (taking of husband's separate property to give to wife upon divorce not justified by
any benefit to public welfare). Arizona is a notable exception to this rule, however. In Arizona, the divisibility upon divorce of property held in joint tenancy with a right to survivorship is controlled by the law that existed at the time the property was acquired, Batesole v.
Batesole, 535 P.2d 1314, 1316 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975), not by the law in effect at the time of
the court proceeding, Jankowski v. Jankowski, 561 P.2d 327, 328 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
Thus, a 1973 statutory amendment allowing trial courts on divorce to "equitably divide"
joint tenancy property which, under prior law, could only be partitioned equally, applied
only prospectively, to property acquired after the effective date of the amendment. See
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laws of Texas are deemed to be remedial, and not to affect vested
rights, section 3.63(b) would not come within the prohibition
against retroactive laws set out in the Texas Constitution.
III.

OTHER POSSIBLE ISSUES

A. Foreign Realty
Section 3.63 requires the court to divide the property in question, "wherever situated." 80 A court having personal jurisdiction of
the parties may, by operation of its decree alone, dispose of real
property located in Texas and personal property located in Texas
or in other jurisdictions.81 It may not, however, by direct operation
of its decree, pass title to realty in other jurisdictions.8" A decree
purporting to pass title to out-of-state realty is not entitled to full
faith and credit in the situs state. 8 However, the decree may be
enforced in that jurisdiction as a matter of comity. 4 The court

does have the power to order a realty owner over whom the court
has personal jurisdiction to execute the necessary documents to effect a conveyance of that land in accordance with the law of the
situs, under penalty of contempt.88 Another alternative available to
Wayt v. Wayt, 600 P.2d 748, 749 (Ariz. 1979).
80. See Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982). If the Texas court fails to
divide out-of-state realty, a spouse may be foreclosed from later asserting an interest in land
held in the other spouse's name. See Estabrook v. Wise, 348 So. 2d 355, 357 (Fla. Ct. App.
1977), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978).
81. Moor v. Moor, 63 S.W. 347, 351-52 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, writ ref'd) (court may
divide personalty located outside Texas in divorce proceeding).
82. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 8 (1909); Brock v. Brock, 586 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1979, no writ); Kaherl v. Kaherl, 357 S.W.2d 622,. 624 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1962, no writ). But see Killpack v. Killpack, 616 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (trial court properly divided community realty
located in Iowa).
83. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 12 (1909).
84. McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 207-08, 345 S.W.2d 722, 733 (1961); accord
Rodgers v. Rodgers, 611 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Ark. 1981). Conversely, one Texas court refused to
entertain a claim that a foreign court did not have jurisdiction over Texas realty once the
foreign divorce decree is final. See Forman v. Forman, 496 S.W.2d 243, 244-45 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
85. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 13 (1909); Rozan v. Rozan, 317 P.2d 11, 15-16 (Cal. 1957);
Hedley v. duPont, 558 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1977), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 570 S.W.2d 384 (1978); accord Kane v. Kane, 577 P.2d 172,
175-76 (Wyo. 1978). Such decrees have been honored in other states. See e.g., Noble v. Noble, 546 P.2d 358, 361 (Ariz. 1976); Woodruffe v. DeMola, 368 A.2d 967, 969 (N.J. Super. Ct.
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the court is to award the foreign realty to the title-holding spouse,
and award offsetting property within the court's reach to the other
spouse. 6
B. Tracing and Burden of Proof
Section 3.63(b)(2) extends the application of section 3.63(b) to
property on hand at the time of dissolution which can be traced to
property described in section 3.63(b)(1). 8 7 The statute does not de-

clare who has the burden to trace. However, a statutory presumption exists that all property on hand at the time of marital dissolution is community property, 88 and is therefore divisible under
section 3.63(a). To overcome this presumption, a spouse must trace
such property to its inception of title8 and establish that the circumstances surrounding the acquisition make the property a separate, not a community, asset. 0 If those circumstances reflect an acquisition when the spouse was domiciled in another jurisdiction,
they should also reflect whether the property would have been
community property had the spouse been domiciled in Texas at
the time of acquisition. As a practical matter, and assuming validity of section 3.63(b), the effort of tracing back to an original acquisition while domiciled in another jurisdiction would only be undertaken by a spouse who wished to avoid both section 3.63(a) and
section 3.63(b). This may be accomplished by showing: (1) that the
Ch. Div. 1976); Whitmer v. Whitmer, 365 A.2d 1316, 1318-19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). See
generally Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 1330 (1970).
86. E.g., Deger v. Deger, 526 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ);
Simonsen v. Simonsen, 414 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, no writ); Risch v.
Risch, 395 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ dism'd), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 10 (1967); accord Martinez v. Martinez, 573 P.2d 667, 670 (Mont. 1978). California has
enacted a statute which expressly authorizes courts to divide out-of-state realty. The court
may:

(1) Require the parties to execute such conveyances or take such other actions
with respect to the real property situated in the other state as are necessary.
(2) Award to the party who would have been benefited by such conveyances or
other actions the money value of the interest in such property that he would have
received if such conveyances had been executed or other actions taken.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.5 (West 1970).
87. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982). The statute does not
provide as clear a statement as one might desire. The deletion of the word "and" from
section 3.63(b)(2) might make the meaning clearer.
88. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975).
89. See Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tex. 1975).
90. See Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 147-48, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1943).
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property in question was not community property under the law of
his domicile at the time of acquisition; and (2) that the property in

question would not have been community property had the acquiring spouse been domiciled in Texas at the time of acquisition.
C.

Conflict of Laws
The interrelation of section 3.63(b) with Texas conflict of laws

rules raises interesting questions. Texas conflict of laws rules provide that the rights of a spouse in the property owned by the other
spouse at the time of marriage are determined, as to the movables,
by the law of the first marital domicile,"1 and as to immovables, by

e Similarly, as to the rights
the law of the situs.9
of spouses in prop-

erty acquired during marriage, the law of marital domicile at the
time of acquisition" controls as to movables," and the law of the
situs controls as to immovable property." The character of prop91. See Avery v. Avery, 12 Tex. 54, 56-57 (1854) (under the law of Georgia, the first
marital domicile, the husband became the owner of all personal property owned by the wife
at the time of marriage; upon removal of the spouses to Texas, the husband continued to be
the owner of such property); see also Tirado v. Tirado, 357 S.W.2d 468, 471-72 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1962, writ dism'd). See generally 3 L. SIMPKINS, TEXAS FAMILY LAW §§
15.4, 16.2 (Speer's 5th ed. 1976).
92. See 3 L. SIMPKINS, TEXAS FAMILY LAW § 16.2, at 177 (Speer's 5th ed. 1976).
93. See Gaulding v. Gaulding, 503 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, no
writ) (law of husband's domicile, as it existed at the time of acquisition, controlled character
of personalty acquired there, regardless of any subsequent changes in the laws of these
jurisdictions).
94. See, e.g., Oliver v. Robertson, 41 Tex. 422, 425 (1874) (money acquired by joint
efforts of spouses while domiciled in Georgia belonged to husband and remained the property of husband after spouses moved to Texas); Tirado v. Tirado, 357 S.W.2d 468, 471-72
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1962, writ dism'd) (severed oil and gas was movable personal
property and its status as separate or community property to be governed by law of domicile of the parties); Huston v. Colonial Trust Co., 266 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (since husband's earnings were his separate property under
Pennsylvania law, Pennsylvania wife acquired no community interest in property purchased
in Texas with those earnings). See generally 3 L. SIMPKINS, TEXAS FAMILY LAW §§ 15.4 at 7,
16.2 at 177 (Speer's 5th ed. 1976).
95. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Skaggs, 122 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1941) (the right to
receive rentals .being immovable, rather than movable, rental income from husband's separate realty in California held separate according to law of situs-California-rather than
according to law of marital domicile-Texas), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 811 (1942); Huston v.
Colonial Trust Co., 266 S.W.2d 231, 233-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(applied Texas' inception of title rule in holding that Texas realty purchased by Pennsylvania resident was separate property because funds used to acquire it belong exclusively to
him under Pennsylvania law); Bell v. Bell, 180 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (trial court's finding that realty located in Washington and Tennes-
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erty, as either separate or community in nature, is determined by
Texas courts in accordance with the foregoing rules." Therefore,
personalty acquired by a spouse while domiciled in Texas will be
separate property only if it meets the definition of separate property set out in the Texas Constitution.' 7 Realty, on the other hand,
acquired by a spouse while domiciled in Texas will be separate or
community, or perhaps some other species of property, in accordance with the law of situs.8
If the court looks to Texas conflict of laws rules in determining,
under section 3.63(b), whether property acquired by a spouse while
domiciled elsewhere would have been community property had the
acquiring spouse been domiciled in Texas at the time of acquisition, the law of the spouse's domicile (i.e., hypothetically Texas)
will control as to movables, but the law of the situs will control as
to immovable property. As a result, the rules used to characterize
immovables will be those of another state, and not those of Texas,
unless by chance the property lies in Texas. This would seem to
defeat the apparent intent of the Texas Legislature to make the
divisibility of such property turn on the community property laws
of Texas. To avoid this situation, section 3.63(b) should be interpreted as requiring the trial court to determine whether the property in question would have been community property, according
to the "local law" of Texas, exclusive of Texas' choice-of-law

see was community property deemed "of no legal effect," since character of such realty is to

be determined by the law where the land is situated). See also 3 L.
LAW

SIMPKINS, TEXAS FAMILY

§ 15.4, at 7 (Speer's 5th ed. 1976). Contra Reeves v. Schulmeier, 303 F.2d 802, 806 (5th

Cir. 1962). In Reeves, the court indicated that Texas cases hold the law of matrimonial
domicile governs the character of Texas realty. Id. at 806. The court may have misconstrued
the application by Texas courts of the rule that property acquired in an exchange has the
same character as the consideration paid. Since the consideration paid was usually movable
(i.e. money), the law of the domicile of the acquiring spouse was determinative of the character of the money paid, and, consequently, of the realty acquired. The basic law applied in
these cases was the law of the situs (i.e., Texas), particularly the rule that property retains
its character as separate or community, through all mutations in form. See id. at 806.
96. See Tirado v. Tirado, 357 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1962, writ
dism'd). See generally 3 L. SIMPKINS, TEXAS FAMILY LAW §§ 15.4, 16.2 (Speer's 5th ed.
1976).
97. See Tirado v. Tirado, 357 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1962, writ
dism'd); TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
98. See Commissioner v. Skaggs, 122 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315
U.S. 811 (1942); Kaherl v. Kaherl, 357 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, no
writ); Bell v. Bell, 180 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
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rules."s
The true character of property acquired by a spouse while domiciled elsewhere will still be an important matter of proof until the
constitutionality of section 3.63(b) is settled. Unless the spouse
overcomes the presumption that the property taken from him by
the trial court's decree was community property, the trial court's
action can be justified on the basis of section 3.63(a). To overcome
this presumption, the spouse must show that the property was acquired by him while domiciled in another jurisdiction, and that,
under relevant law,100 the property was his separate property, or at
least show that it was owned by him to the exclusion of his spouse.
Having established exclusive ownership, he can then argue that the
trial court's action violated federal and/or state constitutional
principles.
D. Marital and Pre-MaritalAgreements
The long-standing rule in Texas is that the rights of spouses
under marital and pre-marital agreements are controlled by the
laws of this state once the parties become domiciled in Texas, irrespective of the validity of the agreements under the law of marital
domicile at the time of contracting.10 1 Such contracts historically
have been declared unenforceable in Texas to the extent that they
purported to alter the definition of separate property set out in the
Texas Constitution.1 0 Since the effective date of the amendment
to article XVI, section 15, of the Texas Constitution, spouses and
persons about to marry may, by written marital or pre-marital
agreement, provide that property on hand or to be acquired, which
would have been community absent the agreement, shall instead

99. This is the analysis used in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws in the
sections which relate to marital property conflict of laws questions. See RESTATEMENT (SzcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 257, 258 (1971). The term "local law" is defined in the Restatement (Second) as "the body of standards, principles and rules, exclusive of its rules of
Conflict of Laws, which the courts of that state apply in the decision of controversies
brought before them." Id. § 4.
100. Unless the spouse proves the relevant law, it will be presumed that these laws are
identical to Texas law. Gevinson v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 449 S.W.2d 458, 465 n.2 (Tex.
1969).
101. Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. 1978); Castro v. Illies, 22 Tex.
479, 498 (1858).
102. Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. 1978).
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be the separate property of one spouse or the other.103 It would

appear, therefore, that under this amendment the range of marital
and pre-marital agreements, contracted in other jurisdictions,
which will be honored by Texas courts has been greatly expanded.

When deciding whether an asset acquired by a spouse while
domiciled in another jurisdiction would have been community
property had the acquiring spouse been domiciled in Texas at the
time of acquisition, a trial court should consider the effect of any
marital or pre-marital agreement which existed at the time of the

acquisition. The agreement would have whatever force Texas law
then allowed for a spouse domiciled in this state. Thus, for property acquired prior to the effective date of the amendment, the
older, more restrictive law relating to the enforceability of marital

and pre-marital agreements would determine the effect of the
agreement. In certain instances, a marital or pre-marital agreement
which would now be enforceable in Texas may have no effect on a
determination under section 3.63(b) where the terms of the agree-

ment violated the public policy of this state as it was understood at
the time.

Additionally, section 3.63(b) appears to take no account of the
effect of a subsequent agreement by the spouses that an asset ac-

quired by a spouse while domiciled elsewhere would thereafter belong exclusively to the acquiring spouse, either as his separate
property or as the sole holder of title to the property.104 The extent
to which such a subsequent agreement restricts the court's power

under section 3.63(b) may then have to be determined with reference to the provisions in the Texas Constitution 0 5 and Family
103. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
104. The now-superceded section 307 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, as
amended in 1971, avoided this problem by excluding from its definition of "marital property" that property "excluded by valid agreement of the parties." UNIFORM MARRIAGE &
DIVORCE ACT § 307(b)(4) commentary, 9A U.L.A. 144 (1971) (amended 1973). The New
York equitable division statute provides: "Nothing [herein] shall be deemed to affect the
validity of any agreement made prior to the effective date of this subdivision." N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 236(B)(3) (McKinney 1979). New York courts, therefore, have held that retroactive application of the new law to agreements valid under prior law is prohibited, Carner v.
Carner, 444 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (App. Div. 1981); Gedraitis v. Gedraitis, 439 N.Y.S.2d 987,
980 (Sup. Ct. 1981), although application of the new law to property not covered by the
agreement has been approved. See Carner v. Carner, 444 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (App. Div.
1981).
105. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol13/iss3/2

24

Stewart and Orsinger: Fitting a Round Peg into a Square Hole: Section 3.63, Texas Famil

19821

SECTION 3.63

Code relating to marital and pre-marital agreements,'06 as well as
consideration of the language in the Eggemeyer decision.''7 In such
a situation, the contract clause of the United States Constitution
might come into play.10 8 Further, application of section 3.63(b) in a
manner that would impair contractural rights established by such
an agreement in property acquired prior to the effective date of the
statute, or prior to the spouses' removal to Texas, could be challenged as violating the prohibition against retroactive laws contained in the Texas Constitution.' 0 '
E.

Other Property Rights and Liabilities

Since section 3.63(b) addresses only the power of the court to
divide property in a decree of divorce or annulment, it has no effect on the property rights and liabilities of the spouses during
marriage. The Texas Family Code still recognizes only two types of
property, i.e., separate and community." 0 There is not, in Texas, a
new category of property called "quasi-community" property. For
this reason, section 3.63(b) does not alter the statutory framework,
set out in Chapter 5 of the Texas Family Code,"' controlling the
property rights and liabilities of spouses.
Section 3.63(b) similary has no effect on the consequences of a
dissolution of marriage by the death of a spouse. A change in the
intestate succession rules of the probate code"' may be something
for future legislatures to consider.
IV.

SUMMARY

Section 3.63(b) is a long-needed statement of how Texas
and family law practitioners should address the property
which arise in the dissolution of a marriage, by divorce or
ment, between spouses who have acquired property while

courts
issues
annuldomi-

106. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.41 - .46 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
107. See Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. 1977).
108. U.S. CoNsT. art. X, § 10, cl. 1; see also Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 563
(1942) (ordingary contract clause analysis applied to prenuptial contracts).
109. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16.
110. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1975).
111. Id. tit. 1, ch. 5.
1*12. Intestate succession rules pertaining to the passing of community and separate
property are set out in Probate Code sections 38 and 45. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 38,
45 (Vernon 1980).
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ciled in other jurisdictions. Prior to the adoption of section 3.63(b),
the laws of this state relating to the marital property rights of
spouses on divorce or annulment dealt only in terms of the concepts of separate and community property that have evolved under
our community property system. To the extent that the question
arose, Texas Zourts sometimes attempted to graft property acquired by spouses while domiciled in non-community property jurisdictions onto our community property system by equating the
common law concept of title ownership to the Texas concept of
separate property. This led to certain assets, such as wages earned
during marriage, being classified as one spouse's separate property.
This result occurred despite the clear policy of this state that such
assets should be available for the trial court to divide, upon divorce
or annulment, to achieve a just and right division of the property
acquired by the spouses through the collective efforts of their marital unit. In many instances, particularly with regard to retirement
benefits, trial courts freely divided such assets, irrespective of their
character, to achieve an equitable division of property. With the
publication of the Eggemeyer opinion,113 and more particularly,
the later-withdrawn opinion in Campbell,1 4 the perhaps ill-considered equating of common law title ownership with separate property assumed significant proportions. Section 3.63(b) has the effect
of applying the traditional power of a Texas court, to divide property in a divorce or annulment proceeding, to assets acquired by
the spouses while domiciled elsewhere. In doing this, the legislature avoided the injustices that sometimes arose when, upon removal of a marriage from one jurisdiction to another, the safeguards of earlier marital property systems were lost, but the
safeguards of the Texas marital property system were not
gained." 5
113. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
114. Campbell v. Campbell, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 391 (June 4, 1980); opinion withdrawn,
24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 84, (Nov. 22, 1980).
115. See Muns v. Muns, 567 S.W.2d 563, 566-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
The court in Muns speculated as follows:
Suppose the husband and wife have lived in a common-law state until the husband
became eligible for retirement, and then they establish a residence for their declining
years in the more benign environment of Texas. Difficulties develop here, and the

wife seeks a divorce, but she has little earning capacity and no property. Back in the
home state a divorce court could have done equity by granting alimony, but no such
remedy is available in Texas, where it is assumed that property accumulated during
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marriage belongs to both spouses. If the Texas court cannot reach the husband's separate property, it has no choice but to leave the wife with no means of support.
d. at 566-67.
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